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‘The Past is a Promise to the Future’: Stories, Persons, and the Devil in 
Greece 
 
 
Dimitri Tsintjilonis University of Edinburgh 
 
 
Drawing on ethnography from central Greece, this paper is about the way people 
narrate their encounters with the devil. Although it echoes the idea that life as told 
and life as lived are structured in the same way, it takes the argument a step further 
by suggesting they are structured through a narrative plot wherein the present and 
the future of the story-tellers predate the past of which their stories tell. It also 
foregrounds the link between this structure and a particular kind of morality which 
replicates the narrative logic of the stories giving rise to an inherently relational 
personhood; a personhood that, just like the way in which its narration destabilizes 
the logic of before and after, destabilizes the distinction between self and other. 
Lastly, contextualizing the current economic crisis in the lives of such persons, it 
suggests we need to think of it in relation to the devil and the stories people tell of 
him. 
 
How do you imagine ‘the devil’ (to diavolo)? Aggeliki,1 in her twenties, thinks 
of him as ‘black, with red eyes, a billy goat’s head and swords for horns’. 
Giannis, in his sixties, depicts him as ‘black, lame and snub-nosed’. For 
Giorgos, in his early fifties, even though ‘he has no eyes, he wears big sun-
glasses’. ‘Why doesn’t the devil have eyes?’, I ask. ‘He doesn’t need them’, 
he answers – ‘he takes ours’. More than that, before he ‘takes our eyes’, he 
‘dazzles us’ and ‘numbs our body’. Christos, Giorgos’s friend, agrees and 
adds: ‘he doesn’t take just our eyes, he takes our legs and our hands, […] he 
silences us, […] enters our body from our mouth, just like our breath’. 
 
  As I found the idea of numb bodies and Christos’s obvious graveness quite 
uncomfortable, I tried to make a joke – admittedly something inane (devil, 
Prada, and sunglasses is rather unfortunately what came to mind!) – which 
made him quite angry. ‘If you don’t want to know’, he said, ‘you shouldn’t ask’! 
‘In any case’, he continued, what he had just told me was not ‘fantasy’ but 
‘something he had lived through’. Christos and Giorgos did not have to 
imagine the devil. They had ‘felt’ him and, in some cases, fought with him. 
Indeed, the devil was often linked to the economic crisis that has engulfed 
Greece. Perceived as a moral crisis, it was intimately associated with his 
presence in their life. As Giorgos put it, ‘the devil is inside the Greeks’. 
 
  This paper is about people like Giorgos and Christos. It is about the way in 
which they remember their encounters with the devil and relate these 
memories in the form of particular narratives. I shall explore the significance of 
these narratives in order to show how my informants articulate a particular 
kind of personhood through them – a personhood articulated, first and 
foremost, in hindsight. In their stories, the distinction between what comes 
before, and what comes after, is undermined by a narrative logic wherein the 
coherence of their identity is achieved backwards – they are back-to-front 
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persons. 
  Most of my informants live in a small town in Central Greece. I had heard a 
number of rumours about people who could see the devil and that is where I 
started. I had the opportunity to work with about twenty people, the youngest 
in her early twenties and the oldest in his eighties. From retired civil servants 
and policemen to domestic carers and shopkeepers, it is difficult to present a 
generalized picture of who they were. In terms of income, most described 
their life as ‘difficult’ but their expectations and hopes for the future were quite 
different. However, what nearly all of them shared was a strong belief in God. 
Although this did not always translate as an attachment to the official Church, 
God was thought to be at the centre of their lives – as a retired civil servant 
put it, ‘God is our life’. One’s relation to God was mostly perceived in terms of 
‘sacrifice’ (thisia) or ‘debt’ (chreos). To echo Maria, a mother of two in her 
early fifties, ‘we owe ourselves to God – life is sacrifice’.   
  Despite the rather dramatic emphasis on sacrifice, it is important to 
emphasize, there was nothing extreme about this God. There were no links 
between my informants and zealotic ecclesiastic or monastic circles. That is 
not to say there were no conservative attitudes in their lives but they did not 
see themselves as the true guardians of the ‘Faith’ or the ‘Nation’. The tropes 
which seem to characterize Greek Orthodox Fundamentalism (e.g., defending 
the values of ‘Fatherland, Religion, Family’ or the inseparability of Greek 
identity from Orthodoxy; see Kessareas 2018) were largely absent in what 
they said or did. In fact, the question of faith was often framed as a ‘human’ 
(anthropino), rather than Greek, quest. In this quest, the devil played a very 
important role and it is this role they shared with me through their stories.2  
  These stories were shared with some reluctance. For many Greeks, 
including many of their friends, my informants’ stories were nothing but 
‘naivety’ and ‘fairy tales’. However, albeit laughing, the very same friends 
would often refuse to discuss them for fear of ‘provoking’ the devil. Something 
that Charles Stewart tried to captured by describing the devil’s nature in 
Greece as ‘amphibological’ (from ‘doubt’ in Greek) – that is, involving no neat 
split between believers and non-believers, people shifting positions, even 
managing to be both at the same time (2008). Something I found myself doing 
too while listening to their narratives. 
  From providing ‘privileged access to the subjective experience of illness’ 
(Woods 2011: 73) to humanizing legal ‘rules and procedures’ (Hinchman & 
Hinchman 1997: 3), narratives seem to be everywhere these days. The 
reason may be, as Unni Wikan has it, that ‘people bleed stories, but 
academics gather narratives’ (2000: 217). For Wikan, story-telling is full of 
unfinished endings and hesitations while ‘telling a neat narrative, nicely 
structured around an ending that gives meaning to the whole thing, is a luxury 
life does not afford to many of the world’s inhabitants’ (ibid.: 232). Although I 
am not sure that life in Greece affords much luxury to my informants, what I 
have gathered are certainly narratives. Despite hesitations and occasional 
silences, their stories were almost always about endings. Endings that ‘gave 
meaning to the whole thing’ bringing together their stories and their lives.  
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  Of course, the intimate link between stories and lives has become almost a 
truism in anthropology. Echoing classic works on the way narrative helps 
order chaotic or discordant experiences (Bruner 1986) and give them 
temporal integration (Ricoeur 1984), anthropologists have explored how it 
enables people to articulate their lives in a meaningful manner. Narrative, as 
Linda Garro and Cheryl Mattingly put it, ‘is a fundamental human way of 
giving meaning to experience’ (2000: 1). ‘Linking motive, act, and 
consequences’ (ibid.), it enables people to position themselves in a 
meaningful world. The meaning-endowing potential of narrative is thought to 
stem from its power to articulate a plot – that is, ‘a meaningful whole’ 
(Mattingly 1994: 813). More than that, people do not plot only their stories. 
They plot their lives too. As Mattingly puts it, quoting Frank Kermode, we act 
‘with the “sense of an ending”’ (ibid.). Thus, our lives and our stories are 
similarly plotted – ‘there is a basic homology between lived time and time 
structured within narrative discourse’ (ibid.:813).3  
  My informants plot too. However, there is something deeply paradoxical in 
the way they do it. The relation between the world in which they tell their 
stories and the world of which their stories tell is inverted. In their narratives, 
the distinction between what comes before and what comes after is 
undermined. In this way, they problematize the main characteristic attributed 
to narrative. As Mattingly has it, 
In a story, time is structured by a movement from one state of affairs (a 
beginning) to a transformed state of affairs (an ending). […] The structure 
of beginning-middle-end presumes, of course, that time is marked by 
anticipation of some end, one which, to make another obvious point, does 
not exist at the beginning. (1994: 819). 
  This is not to suggest that beginnings and endings are always 
unambiguously linked. From ‘what-if’ scenarios to the ‘may-be’ of different 
possible outcomes, the stories people tell can be inherently uncertain. Indeed, 
uncertainty could be seen as intrinsic to the way narrative works. Jerome 
Bruner, for instance, insisted that narratives do not create meaning only by 
ordering experiences but by ‘subjunctivising reality’ too – ‘by trafficking’, that 
is, ‘in human possibilities rather than settled certainties’ (1986: 26). From the 
imagination of alternative futures and indeterminate realities to unclear 
beginnings and endings, there has been a lot of work along these lines (e.g., 
Good 1994, Mattingly 2010). However, although alternative futures and 
unclear endings might produce ambiguous or open-ended narratives, they are 
still marked by anticipation of some kind of future; a future that does not exist 
in the present nor, of course, in the past. In this sense, subjunctive or not, 
they are still about some end that ‘does not exist at the beginning’.  
  In the stories I shall discuss, the end pre-exists the beginning. Such an end 
does not articulate only my informants’ stories but their lives too. ‘I will tell you 
my story as I lived it’, Giorgos said; ‘my life is a story’, Eleni insisted. In this 
sense, they are good examples of ‘historicity’ or, to echo Stephan Palmié and 
Charles Stewart, ‘forms of human awareness of being and becoming in time’ 
(2016: 223) that do not conform to the canons of standard historiography and 
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its linear chronology. 
  Thus, given their paradoxical chronology, how do such narratives give 
meaning to experience? How does one tell of his or her past when their 
present predates it? How are the past, the present and the future integrated in 
the temporality of such stories? More than that, how can these narratives be 
both ‘their story’ and ‘their life’? How does one live in a present that pre-exists 
its own past? How do these narratives link ‘motive, act, and consequences’ 
when the consequences come before motive and act?  
 These are the questions I shall try to answer. In doing so, I will follow the way 
my informants answered my own questions. In the first part of the paper, I 
shall focus on their stories in order to show how life as told is structured 
through a narrative plot wherein the present and the future of the storytellers 
predate the past of which their stories tell – that is, their own past. However, 
these stories were also a manifestation of who they are today. It was their 
encounter with the devil that enabled them to live as ‘good Christians’. In the 
second part of the paper, I shall elucidate how this life is lived through a very 
particular kind of personhood – a personhood that, just like its narration 
undermines the distinction between past and present, undermines the 
distinction between self and other. Lastly, in the third part, I shall show how 
my informants’ understanding of their stories and their lives is replicated in 
their understanding of the current crisis questioning the idea that there is 
something new to the present-day ‘hardships’ of the Greek people. 
 
1. Metalepsis: Christos’s story 
As Stewart notes, the ‘Orthodox Church has always unambiguously 
considered the devil inferior and subordinate to God’ (1991: 146). In fact, it 
was God himself who created the devil. Before he created Adam and Eve, 
God created the angels to act as his messengers. However, led by Satan, a 
group of them revolted and attempted to place themselves higher than God. 
Punished for their arrogance, ‘Satan and his attendant angels were cast down 
from the heavens and compelled to reside variously on earth or beneath the 
earth’ (ibid.: 141). 
  My informants spoke of these angels and their leader in a variety of ways. 
Echoing the New Testament, they were often described as scorpions, lions 
and serpents. Beyond the variety of the terms used, there was agreement as 
to the kind of challenge the devil presents – he was depicted as the 
temptation to cheat, lie and harm those around you. In relation to temptation, 
he was often associated with Genesis in the Old Testament and the story of 
the serpent that tempts Adam and Eve. As temptation, the devil does not deny 
free will – ‘[h]uman choice, both in Eden and after the fall, allows Satan an 
opening that he may exploit’ (ibid.: 142). It is the fear of such an opening most 
of them emphasized because the devil is ‘cunning’. Through his trickery, he 
‘ties you’ (se denei) and keeps you away from God. Perhaps, their stories can 
be described as narratives of untying. They loosened and eventually 
discarded these ties by ‘turning their soul towards God’. It is this turning the 
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stories narrated. 
  Using a single story to structure my discussion, I shall concentrate on 
Christos’s ‘experience’ which, despite missing the drama of other encounters 
with the devil, exhibits in a clear way a number of characteristics shared by 
many of the stories I collected. 
 
… 
 
Once you have driven over the bridge, the road follows the river for a hundred 
meters or so before turning left and starting to climb towards a small village 
about twenty kilometres from where he lives. Standing at the edge of the road, 
Christos is trying to explain what happened ten years ago. 
 
  He was driving, on his own, from a friend’s place back to his home. Even 
though it was very early in the morning, ‘still dark’, he did not feel especially 
tired. He had drunk nothing more than two beers the night before. He had just 
crossed the bridge and was getting ready to take the first bend when he 
suddenly felt ‘lost’ and the world around him ‘dissolved’. He lost 
consciousness and, when he ‘opened his eyes’ again, he realized he had 
crashed into a ditch and onto a supporting wall. Dazed and frightened, he 
managed to get out of the car.  
 
  How did he feel ‘lost?’, I asked. Did he see anything? Did he hear anything? 
But, just like ten years ago, he could not really explain what had happened. 
He remembers that he felt strange. He ‘could not see’ and ‘could not move’. 
He talked about dizziness and heart palpitations. He thought he heard 
someone whisper his name. But he could not remember now, just as he could 
not remember then. There was one word that he kept using – stenochoria. A 
kind of numbness, an inability to breathe and move. It was, he said, like ‘a big 
weight on [him]’. 
 
  He went on to describe how he checked himself for injuries before phoning 
his brother to come and give him a lift back. In the afternoon, they returned to 
check over the car more carefully. It was only then that he realized how 
serious it could have been. The car was a write-off. 
 
  Two weeks later, on the other side of the mountains, he visited one of his 
best friends in a neighbouring town. As he was looking for a new car, they had 
planned to check a few car dealerships and have dinner together. As soon as 
he knocked on his friend’s door, he felt a strange ‘jubilation’ that almost made 
him cry. He followed his friend into the living room where he realized there 
was another visitor – an old monk from a local monastery who was a close 
friend of the family. He kissed his hand and sat down. It was when the monk 
‘touched him’ that his jubilation became almost unbearable. He calmed down 
only when the old man said his name: ‘so your name is Christos’. ‘You are 
lucky’, he went on, ‘to have the name of Christ; it’s not a coincidence, nothing 
is coincidental’.  
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  After a few minutes of silence, the monk asked him: ‘did you have an 
accident recently’? Quite surprised at the question, as neither he nor his friend 
had mentioned it, Christos explained what had happened and showed him the 
scratches on his hands. ‘It’s nothing’, the monk said. ‘Christ saved you. He’s 
the one who kept you alive. Two more road-bends and you would have fallen 
off the cliff. He didn’t allow it to happen because, if it had, you would have 
delivered your spirit to the devil. You see, Christ has other plans for you’. 
 
  This is where my friend’s narrative both starts and ends. It starts because, as 
he put it, ‘everyone has a story but he needs to find it, to understand it’ and, 
through his accident (which, he insisted, ‘was not an accident’), he had. It 
ends because, it ceases being a story and becomes a quest for a particular 
kind of life – a life which, to echo a number of my informants with similar 
experiences, demands that your ‘soul is turned towards God’. 
 
  Here is how Christos explained it: 
 
From that moment, I started to ‘search myself’. This was the day I realized 
‘what I will have been today’ (afto pou tha eho ginei simera), […] ‘where I 
will have ended up today’ (pou tha eho katalixei simera). I started visiting 
monasteries and churches, asking questions and trying to learn. It is the 
‘eyes of the soul’ that matter […]. There is an invisible war [between God 
and the devil] and it is only these eyes that allow us to see the signs. Until 
you can see the signs, you don’t realize where the demons are and they 
are everywhere. I changed, everything changed! 
 
  But why did he have to change? Why did the devil choose to (almost) take 
him rather than his brother or anybody else? He did not really explain. He 
alluded to ‘mistakes’, some kind of a ‘difficulty’ but did not want to say 
anything more. ‘Did you believe in the devil before the car crash?’, I asked. ‘I 
never thought about it’, he answered. He had heard stories – stories about 
demons and ‘bad spirits’ but he never paid much attention. However, he 
sought the advice of a local priest who brought up his family in the town – a 
priest well known for his ability to exorcise the devil and his demons. 
 
  In fact, there are more priests in the region who practise exorcism and a few 
of my informants had a relationship with one or other of these priests. In some 
cases, this relationship involved confession and ‘spiritual’ guidance; in others, 
simply seeking ad hoc advice. Just like Christos, they were seeking guidance 
or advice because of unexpected events in their lives – ‘problems in the 
family’ were often mentioned. However, not everyone was in contact with one 
of them. Aris, for instance, spoke of ‘bad dreams’ that one of his neighbours 
had helped him understand. Eventually, though, most did seek the help of the 
Church – help that, in most cases, came from local priests. Village priests who 
were described as ‘traditional’ but, as far as I know, were not linked to any 
fundamentalist organizations. Still, however it happened, everyone 
emphasized how much their encounter with the devil had changed them.           
 
  Christos speaks of this change in terms of ‘repentance’ that gave him the 
opportunity to transform himself. Through prayer, fasting, communion and 
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guidance from ‘charismatic’ priests, he developed into what ‘[he] will have 
been today’. Perhaps, the one change that encapsulates his transformation is 
giving up the job he had at the time of the car crash in order to look for 
something that would allow him to share the burdens of others – he became a 
policeman. 
 
… 
 
Christo’s story reflects a number of themes well explored in the 
anthropological study of narrative. Ochs and Capps (1996) capture many of 
these themes in an especially suggestive way and can be used to highlight 
the challenge his ‘experience’ presents. Echoing the work of people like 
Ricoeur and Bruner, they emphasize the idea that personal narrative ‘is born 
out of experience and gives shape to experience’ (1996: 20). Hence, stories 
and lives cannot be separated. They also highlight the significance of ‘forging 
elements into a plot’ (ibid.: 25) – a narrative plot which imbues the past with 
significance in an attempt to construct present and future worlds. More than 
that, in terms of temporality, such a plot is told from the perspective of the 
present. A perspective within which, as they stress, ‘the most fundamental 
linguistic marking of the past’ is the past tense – a tense that ‘implies a time 
closer to the present’ (ibid.). In this way, stories do not simply represent or 
evoke the past; rather, they create an intricate link between the past and the 
present. Perhaps, as Ochs and Capps put it, it is important ‘to recognize that 
lives are the pasts we tell ourselves’ (ibid.: 21). 
  However, although he is forging a plot and creates a link between different 
points in time, I do not think what Christos tells himself is the past. Instead, I 
would like to suggest that what he tells himself is the future – a future 
conflated with the present and predating the past. To use his own words, his 
encounter with the devil was what helped him realize ‘what [he] will have been 
today’, ‘where [he] will have ended up today’.4 Thus, to echo David Vilaseca, 
Christos’s past is ‘produced in that most paradoxical of tenses, the future 
perfect (future antérieur), a cluster of features that literally “are not” but always 
“will have been” (what came before “myself”, what preceded my own 
“renaissance”)’ (1999: 429).  
  In this sense, Christos’s narrative and the transformation it indexes can be 
seen as metaleptic, Moebius-strip like structures that confound the linear 
chronology of everyday existence and undermine the logic on which the 
distinction between cause and effect depends. 
What distinguishes the ‘Moebius strip’ is its subversion of the usual 
(Euclidean) way of representing space: the strip appears to have two sides 
when in fact it has only one: hence the impossibility of distinguishing its 
‘back’ from its ‘front’. Likewise, what distinguishes a metalepsis (the 
rhetorical figure that takes a cause for its effect or vice versa) is its 
undermining of the temporal logic upon which the very distinction between 
cause and effect (what comes before and what comes after) is based. 
(ibid.: 427-8) 
  In other words, the Christos who tells the story precedes the Christos of 
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whom the story tells. The metaleptic nature of the narrative enables him to 
generate his own biography in the mode of ‘what I will have been’. With the 
early Christos, the one before the crash, ‘always already an effect and an 
offshoot of his namesake successor’ (ibid: 429), it is present-day Christos who 
precedes him in a fashion that undermines the distinction between before and 
after turning himself into a cause and effect of his own history. Perhaps, 
echoing Benjamin’s ‘tiger’s leap into the past’ (1969: 255; cf. Vilaseca 1999), 
his narrative can be described as ‘antinomic’ – that is, to adopt Brian 
Richardson’s definition, ‘a doubly linear story that simultaneously moves 
backward and forward in time’ (2002: 49). 
  Christos’s narrative articulates the emergence of a rather distinctive 
understanding of the person he is – a person, that is, which produces its own 
biography in retrospect and in the future perfect of ‘I will have been’. 
Conflating the hindsight of the storyteller with the foresight of the story’s 
protagonist, it projects the future into the past and the past into the future. It 
allows him to look forward as though looking back. In terms of its narrative 
plot, the end pre-exists the beginning. Rather than anticipating a future, it 
turns the past into an effect of it. His story is not about what he was or what 
he is but about what always he will have been – to use his own words, ‘a good 
Christian’.5 
 
  Through his encounter with the devil, he realized that ‘the eyes of the soul’ 
see much more than ‘the eyes of the head’. Now, as he can ‘see’ the devil, he 
can help others ‘see’ him too. Help them separate ‘the good’ from ‘the bad’. 
This is the quest that makes him a ‘good Christian’ and embeds the person 
‘[he] will have been’ in a local moral world. His story is not a simple recounting 
of his encounter with the devil, it is also a manifestation of who he is today – 
his existence, that is, within such a local moral world. This existence is 
articulated through a specific kind of personhood. 
 
  In the following section, I shall explore this personhood in order to show how 
it is intrinsically linked to a very particular understanding of morality. A morality 
which replicates the narrative logic of his story giving rise to an inherently 
relational person – a person that, just like its narration destabilizes the logic of 
cause and effect, destabilizes the distinction between self and other. 
 
2. Perichoresis: Christos’s ‘heart’ 
 
The idea of ‘local moral worlds’ is mostly associated with the work of authors 
like Arthur Kleinman (2006) and Steven Parish (2008) – with work, that is, 
within which ‘morality is a form of consciousness’ (Csordas 2013: 524). 
However, to do justice to Christos and his story, we need to approach his 
moral world by going beyond morality as a form of consciousness. For 
Kleinman and Parish, consciousness is nothing more than a manifestation of 
a human self’s realization. Such a realization does not capture the way 
Christos is a ‘Good Christian’ because of this emphasis on the self. As Parish 
has it, 
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The self is not an essence, provided by nature or culture, but rather a 
process of living, existing, adapting, using capacities that human beings 
have – most centrally, in my estimation, their powers of memory, feeling, 
reflexivity. Using these capacities, the human self is capable of 
experiencing self, and reflecting on itself, not just consciously, but in 
struggles to be and to adapt. (2008: xi) 
  Thus, even though the self is not supposed to be an essence, it very much 
is. Caught in the ‘struggles to be and to adapt’, it is the originator of its own 
reflexive life and its travails. Just like memory and reflexivity, ‘the struggles to 
be and to adapt’ are predicates of being. Essentialized through these 
predicates, the self remains originary. In the encounters with the devil that lie 
at the center of my discussion, the self is not so much a cause but an effect 
or, rather, cause and effect intermingle substituting for each other. More than 
that, Christos does not simply struggle against the devil; he also struggles for 
those around him and, in this struggle, he replicates the way he is with God.  
  Echoing the significance of this for and with, what I would like to suggest is 
that the life his encounter with the devil revealed manifests a very particular 
ethics – an ethics he describes as ‘touching’ or ‘embracing’ others with his 
heart. It is this ethics that replicates the metaleptic logic of his story and gives 
rise to an inherently relational ethical self. With this ethics of the heart, as I will 
show, it is not simply a question of appreciating the way in which Christos’s 
life is entangled with the lives of others but of coming to terms with the fashion 
in which this entanglement implies an absence of gaps between people, an 
embodied inter-penetration within which human beings are ex-centric.  
  Of course, in anthropology, the significance of ex-centricity is a truism – from 
sociality to intersubjectivity, it has been theorized in a number of different 
ways. However, as Hayder Al-Mohammad puts it (2010: 437), 
What is odd, […] is our ability to commit to a notion of human-being as 
eccentric (i.e. outside itself), or in the parlance of postmodernism, ‘de-
centred’, spatially and temporally, inter-involved and intersubjective, yet our 
notion of ethics tends invariably towards and is centred on an ethics of the 
‘self’.  
  Thus, echoing the limitations of work like Parish’s, this emphasis on an 
ethics of the self may be seen as another manifestation of our inability to think 
of morality and moral worlds beyond the self. Even the more reflexive ‘ethical 
turn’ of the last ten or fifteen years has not managed to avoid foregrounding 
an ethics of the self (e.g., Laidlaw 2002, Zigon 2007). In the work of Jaret 
Zigon, for instance, the ‘ethical moment’ is clearly differentiated from morality 
as ‘a moment of conscious reflection and dialogue with one’s own moral 
dispositions’ (2009: 83). In this way, the self embarks on yet another quest 
giving anthropologists the opportunity to formulate ‘an account of how the 
individual is able to consciously and intentionally remake her habitus’ (ibid.). 
Zigon’s emphasis on the individual self, just like Parish’s or Kleinman’s work, 
would misconstrue Christos’s struggle and the ethics involved in it. 
  This is not to suggest that there has been no work that attempts to question 
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the predominance of the individual self and to frame ethical self-awareness in 
ways which transcend the model of self-consciousness. Al-Mohammad 
himself mentions the work of Saba Mahmood (2005) and Charles Hirschkind 
(2006). Nevertheless, the problem remains. For example, relying on 
Foucault’s celebrated ‘techniques of the self’, Mahmood charts the way in 
which young Egyptian women who are members of an urban mosque 
movement come to constitute and understand themselves as ethical subjects. 
However, the ethical process she is describing is still a process of self-
fashioning. Whether it succeeds or not, it is still articulated as a technique of 
and for the self which ‘leaves as unproblematic relations with others as 
subjects, bypassing the inter-subjectivity of relationships’ (Retsikas 2013: 
120). 
  In this way, whatever else it might be, the ethical encounter remains a self-
quest – a quest which would fail to address the fashion in which Christos’s 
ethics of the heart is constituted with and for others.6 So, to return to the 
ethnography, what is the ethics of the heart and how is it formulated? 
… 
 
‘This is what it’s like’, Christos says, pointing at the church. ‘The Church is 
God’s embrace, it’s his heart’. He understands his own quest for ‘what [he] will 
have been today’ along similar lines. He too has managed to learn how to 
embrace the people around him with his heart. His encounter with the devil 
has enabled him ‘to walk with his heart in front [of him]’. 
 
  The church he is pointing at is not in the town in which he lives. This is June 
2014 and we have travelled to a village, three hours away, in order to meet a 
priest Christos admires and describes as ‘charismatic’. Father Anastasis is in 
his late sixties. He is tall and full of rigour. Unfortunately, there is not much 
time for discussion. With the ordinary service over, Father Anastasis is 
preparing to share his ‘charisma’ with those that need his help. As soon as 
some of the ordinary church goers have left, he asks those of us standing 
near the door and windows to close them.  
 
  It is at this point I notice that another group of people have entered the 
church. ‘The ones taken by demons’ (oi demonismenoi), Christos whispers in 
my ear. With the doors and windows closed, we spent the next hour in 
sweltering heat watching Father Anastasis fight the devil and his demons. 
There is a middle-aged woman who keeps cursing God. There is a young 
man who keeps spitting and shouting. There is a young girl who keeps 
laughing and provoking the priest. ‘Look, look’, Christos whispers every time 
the priest touches one of them with his hand. His touch ‘burns’, ‘hurts’, 
‘scorches’. It is his scorching touch that ‘sets them alight’ and forces the 
demons out. The crucial thing, as Christos has it, is that the priest does not 
touch them with his hand – ‘he touches them with his heart’ (tous akoumbai 
me tin kardia tou).7 In other words, the efficacy of the exorcism depends on a 
very particular understanding of the relation between the exorcist and the 
afflicted which is articulated in and through the heart. Touching those who are 
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possessed by demons with his heart, Father Anastasis shares their pain and 
‘his love for God with them’. He ‘embraces them’. 
 
  Christos is not equating the strength of his heart with that of the priest. He is 
only trying to show me the significance of the heart in the life of a ‘good 
Christian’ – a Christian who is prepared to embrace those in need with his 
heart. What makes this embrace especially difficult to understand is the way it 
intermingles the one and the many. While he is performing the exorcism, 
Father Anastasis remains himself but he also becomes a part of those he 
touches and they a part of him. As Christos put is, ‘he is inside them’ (einai 
mesa tous), ‘his heart is beating with their hearts’ (I kardia tou htipaei me tin 
kardia tous) but it is the efficacy of his ‘innocent’ self that enables him to do 
what he is doing. In a wonderful expression, which I heard from another 
priest, the ones he is helping ‘are on his bill’ (einai ston logariasmo tou), ‘they 
are charged [by God] to his account’ (tous hreonetai ston logariasmo tou). 
This is the account God will check when Father Anastasis dies in order to 
decide the fate of his soul. 
 
  In the next few weeks, I had the opportunity to discuss the significance of the 
heart with a number of my informants. In her early fifties, Maria is looking after 
her elderly parents. She has also devoted herself to taking care of a young 
boy that needed her help. Like Christos, she had an encounter with the devil 
which helped her understand how important it is to engage with God though 
one’s heart. As she put it, you see God through the ‘eyes of your soul’ but 
your soul is ‘in your heart’. Using the ‘eyes of your head’ is not enough 
because God is something you ‘feel’ rather than understand with your ‘brain’. 
She perceives her relationship with her parents and the boy in terms of her 
heart – she ‘shares’ (mirazei) her heart with them. They become a part of her 
just like she becomes a part of them. Their hearts are ‘beating together’. 
However, like with Father Anastasis, it is still Maria’s ‘account’. Her quest to 
become and remain a good Christian.    
 
  More evocatively, Giorgos places his right hand on his heart and starts 
counting its beats – ‘one, two, three …’. ‘You hear God’, he says; ‘you don’t 
see him, you hear him as you hear your heart’. Giorgos is in his early fifties 
and owns a small shop in the centre of town. His quest for the ‘true faith’ 
started with an encounter with the devil too – with Christ’s help, he had to fight 
him for a whole night. This encounter led him to the true Christian life – a life 
which ‘is lived with the heart’. As Christ ‘touched him’ with his heart, the night 
he fought with the devil, he wants to ‘touch’ the people around him. As he 
became a part of God, he wants them to become a part of him. For Giorgos, 
just like Maria and Christos, to touch people with your heart is to share their 
problems and their pain, ‘to become one’ (na gineis ena) with them and allow 
them to become ‘a part of yourself’ (ena kommati to eaftou sou). ‘The heart is 
embrace’ (i kardia einai agkalia), he says with a smile. 
 
  There are similarities between the way in which my informants foregrounded 
the heart and its significance within the Greek Orthodox monastic tradition. 
Hagiorite monks believe that ‘the soul (psichi) of a man consists of three 
different qualities: Logiki, Noera and Zotiki. […] Logiki is for thinking, Noera is 
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for feeling and Zotiki is for moving’ (Coubarelis 1995: 67). Each one is 
associated with a different part of the human body - logiki is lodged in the 
brain, noera in the heart and zotiki in the genital organs (ibid.). However, 
although they are all important, it is with noera we perceive God – indeed, 
noera is described as ‘the eye of the soul’ (ibid.: 164). My informants never 
spoke of noera but they did speak of the ‘eyes of the soul’ and the heart. In 
fact, in terms of the actual senses, the vision that emerges from one’s heart is 
associated more with ears than eyes. To echo Maria, you ‘hear God inside 
you, you listen to Him with your heart’. 
 
  Beyond the monastic tradition and religion, the emphasis on sharing one’s 
heart as a form of relationship brings to mind an idiom often utilized to 
describe intimate male friends in Greece. They are ‘friends of the heart’. As 
Papataxiarchis puts it, they ‘share what lies in the heart’ (1991: 170). ‘Heart-
friendship’ is about sharing and sameness. It is a relationship which, just like 
the ones Maria or Giorgos spoke about, allows people to ‘express their 
feelings, not to one another, but with another’ (ibid.: 178). 
 
  Thus, the stories my friends tell of their encounter with the devil are 
intrinsically associated with the emergence of a distinct kind of personhood – 
a personhood premised on the efficacy of the heart. It is through their heart 
they come to know God and relate to those around them. They walk with their 
heart ‘in front’ of them. They embrace those who need them with their heart – 
just like God does. In this way, their relationship with God is replicated in 
relation to those around them giving rise to an inherently relational ethics; an 
ethics which subverts any clear distinction between inside and outside or self 
and other. More than that, this subversion is premised on their quest to 
intermingle with those they embrace while they remain committed to their own 
selves, their own ‘account’ – to be, that is, both one and many.   
 
  Perhaps the best way to describe this subversion is as extimacy. Meant to 
question the separation of inside and outside, the term was introduced by 
Jacques Lacan. By asserting that the interior is present in the exterior and 
vice versa, extimacy was meant to problematize binary oppositions like 
subject/object, past/future and, above all, self/other. In Lacan’s understanding 
of subjectivity, as the unconscious is outside us, the human subject is not 
simply de-centred but ‘ex-centric’ (1991: 9). Along these lines, the way my 
informants’ ethics is formulated places their heart both inside and outside 
them reflecting an ‘intimate exteriority’ (Lacan 1992: 139) within which they 
intermingle with others. 
 
  However, rather than Lacan’s psychoanalytic elaboration, what makes 
extimacy especially relevant to my discussion is the way it echoes a number 
of much older Christian conceptualizations of the relationship between 
humans and God. Conceptualizations like Saint Augustine’s conception of 
God as ‘more interior than my most interior being’ (Confessions, III, VI) or, 
much more significantly for my purposes, the patristic notion of perichoresis 
and the way it was developed over the years in the context of the Eastern 
Orthodox Church.  
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  The doctrine of perichoresis has been extremely important in Christian 
theology. Although the verb perichoreo (from which the noun is derived) 
appears for the first time in the work of Gregory Nazianzus and his Epistle 
101, it can be traced back to the Stoic concept of mixture (krasis) which 
‘means a complete mutual interpenetration of two substances that preserves 
the identity and properties of each intact’ (Harrison 1991: 54). Developed 
further by theologians like Maximus the Confessor and Pseudo-Cyril, it came 
to occupy an extremely important position in theology where, ‘it conveys the 
simultaneity of rest and movement, of coinherence and interpenetration, 
among the persons of the Trinity, between the two natures in Christ, and 
among God and deified human persons in the transfigured creation’ (ibid.: 
55). This interpenetration is also reflected in the belief that all the persons of 
the Trinity are consubstantial with each other – they are of ‘one essence’ 
(homoousios).  
 
  Hence, invoking a distinctive kind of mixture, perichoresis involves unity in 
separation and vice versa. The persons of the Trinity interpenetrate each 
other; they are in one another but remain distinct. As Jurgen Moltman puts it, 
‘The doctrine of the perichoresis links together in a brilliant way the threeness 
and the unity, without reducing the threeness to the unity, or dissolving the 
unity in the threeness’ (1981: 175). In the kind of theology Moltman’s work 
represents, the significance of this threeness has been used to distinguish 
between the way the conceptualization of the Trinity was developed in the 
East and in the West. More specifically, 
 
it is often claimed that the Cappadocians in the East took as their starting 
point the three persons of the Trinity and then asked about unity whereas 
Augustine in the West began with the oneness of God, with an abstract 
notion of the divine substance, and then puzzled over how to give an 
account of the threeness of the persons. (Kilby 2000: 434)  
 
  Whether such sharp differentiation between East and West is justified or not, 
there is something of perichoresis in the life of my informants and the way 
they are separate and united both with the people around them and with God. 
‘To embrace with your heart’ those who need you is to become a part of them 
and they a part of you. However, despite this intermingling, you remain 
yourself. More than that, this embrace replicates the way you were embraced 
by God when you encountered the devil. 
 
  Thus, perichoresis invites us to shift our thinking away from the dualism 
implicit in the contrast between self and other, individuality and collectivity, the 
one and the many. It gives us the opportunity to appreciate the proximity and 
openness of the ethics of the heart without having to think in terms of a self 
and an other. Plurality never becomes sameness but, at the same time, it 
does not turn into absolute difference. As perichoretic selves, my informants 
can be a part of others and others can be a part of them without risking their 
individuality – an individuality which echoes the way the persons of the Trinity 
interpenetrate each other instantiating unity in separation and vice versa.           
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  Of course, I cannot pretend that any of my informants were theologians. In 
fact, aside from a discussion or two with a couple of priests, perichoresis 
never came up. Even when I asked people like Maria and Giorgos what they 
thought of it, there was very little they could say. Interestingly, however, they 
explained it in terms of perichora – that is, ‘surrounding’ or ‘neighbouring’ 
which captures the sense of connection and proximity without definite breaks 
or distance (as in ‘town surroundings’).  
 
  Nevertheless, to return to Christos, he is with God in the same way he tries 
to be with others. His story and his self are parts of each other. The logic of 
his narrative is replicated in the logic of his ethical quest and his body. Just 
like metalepsis undermines the temporal logic of cause and effect in his story, 
perichoresis subverts the distinction between the inside and the outside in his 
body. His heart, the locus of his faith and his most treasured feelings, is 
externalized in an ‘intimate exteriority’ giving rise to a perichoretic self. 
 
  Intriguingly, both as metalepsis and perichoresis, his encounter with the devil 
extends beyond the particularities of his own life. It gives rise to an exegesis 
of ‘historical’ events which allows Christos to locate himself in the wider 
context of Greece and, more specifically, ‘The Crisis’ – a crisis which, as I 
shall show, is grasped as another manifestation of the devil. 
 
 
3. I Krisis (‘The Crisis’): The Future of Christos’s Past 
 
July 2017. Sitting in a cafes in the town square, we are discussing the way 
‘The Crisis’ started. ‘It was Andreas Papandreou’, Christos says. 
  Papandreou’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) brought to an end 
50 years of political domination by conservative forces and became 
synonymous with the political slogan ‘change’. This was 1981. ‘Change!’, 
Christos laughs. ‘Nothing changed; just like everyone else, he just wanted to 
eat, he was greedy – greedy like the devil’. To ‘eat’ (phaei), in this context, is 
to plunder the wealth of the country. However, there is nothing surprising 
about Papandreou’s greediness – after all, as Christos put it, ‘he was not even 
Greek; American he was’. And the Americans, ‘as we all know’, have been 
behind most of the upheavals that befell Greece in recent years. In this way, 
Christos brought together the military Junta of the late 60s and early 70s, the 
partition of Cyprus, the economic downturn of 2008 and, of course, the crisis 
and austerity of the last eight years.  
  Many of those to whom I spoke expressed similar sentiments. However, 
rather than ‘the Americans’, it was ‘the Europeans’, ‘the foreigners’ or ‘the 
West’ who were responsible for Greece’s woes. Just like Christos’s 
‘Americans’, ‘the Europeans’, ‘the foreigners’ and ‘the West’ allowed people to 
make connections between disparate events in Greek history bringing them 
together.  
  The manner in which my informants used the devil’s greediness to connect 
historical events echoes a number of recent ethnographic analyses of Greece 
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and the economic crisis which illustrate different ways in which the past 
resurfaces in the present (see Knight & Stewart 2016). Daniel Knight, for 
instance, has tried to ‘follow [his] informants as they “bounce around” the past, 
sewing together moments that help them make sense of their current 
situation’ (2017: 28). He shows how their narratives jump from describing the 
oppression in the Ottoman era to War World II occupation and the recent 
stock market crash. These narratives bring together the past and the present 
in an attempt to explain the current crisis and imagine the future. In the 
process, different moments of the past ‘are relived’ in the present creating a 
(poly)temporal experience of time and history. 
  Nevertheless, there is an important difference between my ethnography and 
work like Knight’s. Despite a shared emphasis on the paradoxical temporality 
of the narratives, my informants do not try to recover meaning from the past in 
an attempt to make sense of the present and imagine the future. It is not the 
past that speaks to the future but the future that speaks to the past. 
Replicating their encounter with the devil and the way it is narrated, the 
present precedes the past turning the current crisis into a cause and effect of 
its own history. The economic crisis is nothing more than another 
manifestation of the way in which the devil’s greediness is present in people’s 
lives. Like Christos’s story, the history of the crisis is read backwards 
foregrounding the devil. This emphasis on the devil problematizes the idea 
that there is anything new to the current crisis – an idea which dominates 
most of the ethnographic literature that explores its significance (for examples, 
see Kalantzis 2016: 7). 
  However, to return to the ethnographic literature, there are similarities 
between my argument and work that ‘describes “the new” as building on pre-
existing attitudes’ (ibid.). In an intriguing argument that moves beyond the 
assumed objectivity of historical events and the way they may be 
remembered, Charles Stewart explores dreams of religious icons in Island 
Greece as elaborations of previously unknown episodes from the past, as 
‘novel histories’ rather than ‘memories’ (2012: 215). If we were to conflate 
‘novel histories’ and ‘memories’ in order to think about ‘novel memories’, we 
would have a good approximation of the way my informants foreground the 
devil and interpret the signs of his presence. They remember the future but 
the future they remember is yet to happen – it will happen when these signs 
are recognized for what they are. In order to explicate these signs and the 
presence of the devil in the current crisis, let me return to my informants’ 
views of ‘the Europeans’ or ‘the Americans’ and the way they ‘sold’ or 
plundered Greece. 
  It would be easy to dismiss such views as examples of obsessive suspicion 
and paranoia. However, as Brown and Theodossopoulos argue in their 
analysis of similar narratives that emerged as explanations of the 1999 NATO 
intervention in Yugoslavia, ‘(r)ather than dismissing their tellers and listeners 
as paranoid, schizophrenic or simply “other”, we should perhaps seek to 
appreciate the bases of their appeal and coherence’ (2000: 8). In their work, 
they link such narratives to anxiety which arises when ‘a culturally constructed 
universe’ cannot explain the logic of political events. From a different point of 
 16 
view, Greek discontent against foreigners may reflect what Herzfeld has 
construed as ‘cryptocolonialism’ – ‘the paradoxical condition’, as he puts it, ‘of 
a national independence that was contingent on the approval and support of 
colonial powers’ (2011: 25). Cryptocolonialist or not, the current crisis may be 
seen as opposed to Greek understandings of themselves and their world. For 
instance, the idea of a national debt that has to be repaid once and for all is 
opposed to the traditional view of obligation ‘in which creditor and debtor are 
roles taken in endless alternation’ (ibid.: 24).  
  My informants’ views on ‘Americans’ or ‘Europeans’ were anything but 
exercises in paranoia. Still, in most cases, they did not reflect discontent 
against foreigners or a culturally constructed universe pushed to the limits of 
its explanatory power. Instead, linking ‘the Americans’ and ‘the Europeans’ 
with the devil, they were attempts to criticize the Greeks themselves. As Maria 
had it, ‘the West sold Greece off but it was us who allowed them to do it’ – it 
was our insatiable desire for ‘wealth’, the constant quest for ‘material things’. 
Once again, it was Christos who captured this sense of disillusionment best: 
‘it is the Americans’ fault’, he said; ‘but what can you do?’, he continued; ‘we 
are all Americans now, we see only the flesh’. Similarly, for Maria, ‘we are 
governed by Pharisees and most of us are the same, […] this is a rotting 
society’. 
  However, what needs to be stressed is that it does not have to be like this. 
God gave us the opportunity to realize what is happening and change it. The 
‘signs’ (simadia), to echo Giorgos, ‘are here’. In one way or another, most of 
my informants spoke about signs – signs which show the presence of the 
devil and the way he tempts us through material things. What is remarkable is 
the way a particular set of prophecies8 was used by many of them to illustrate 
these signs (Brown and Theodossopoulos 2000: 8). These prophecies are 
mostly associated with Kosmas the Aitolian or Patrokosmas (‘Father 
Kosmas’), a Greek Orthodox monk who was born in 1714 and put to death by 
the Ottomans in 1779. Eventually, he was glorified by the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate in 1961. Father Kosmas is famous throughout Greece for his 
prophecies – it is said that anything from the destructiveness of aerial 
bombardment to the development of the telephone or the internet can be 
found in his prophecies (see Vlahos 2017).  
  It was through Father Kosmas God gave us the opportunity to realize what 
was happening and change it. However, we did not because we failed to ‘see’ 
the meaning of the signs. For instance, when television aerials started 
appearing on the roofs of our houses, we did not realize they were ‘the horns 
of the devil’ as he had prophesized. Along these lines, televisions, mobile 
phones, climate change, ‘stress’, they were all described as signs of the devil 
– signs we failed to recognize for what they were. The crisis itself is explicated 
along these lines. Reflecting on the way debt has forced people to share their 
meagre resources, Maria referred to Father Kosmas’s prophecy of ‘three 
families [living] in a single house’. Discussing the irrationality of the 
innumerable pension cuts, Christos described Syriza and the Greek prime 
minister as ‘alala kai balala’. Almost everyone spoke about Father Kosmas’s 
prophecy according to which ‘they will put a tax on hens and windows’ – 
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something that happened with the ENFIA tax imposed on 2014 as an attempt 
to secure Greece’s debt re-payments. The signs are here, ‘in front of our 
eyes’, but we do not recognize them for what they are. 
  It is this lack of recognition that links my informants’ stories with ‘The Crisis’. 
Their exegesis, just like the story of Christos’s encounter with the devil, is 
based on the idea that the present would have been configured by the right 
future if it had been properly understood in the past. In other words, the origin 
of the crisis is constructed from their interpretation of signs which are 
themselves effects of the interpretation. The signs of the devil both precede 
the crisis and are a product of it – that is, the crisis functions as both an effect 
and a cause of its own history undermining the temporal logic upon which the 
distinction between cause and effect depends.  
  More than that, the devil himself can be seen as a sign. A sign of what needs 
to be conquered within each one of us and, in this sense, a sign from God. To 
echo one of my friends, who was a priest, ‘[the devil] laughs when we laugh 
and cries when we cry’; he is ‘our twin, our mirror’. However, the ‘greediness’ 
associated with the devil is not something that characterizes only Greeks, 
politicians, ‘the Americans’ or ‘the West’. It is something that characterizes all 
‘humans’ (anthropous). The devil is within each one of us. He is in our 
thoughts and actions when our ‘soul is not turned towards God’. After all, as 
Christos had it, ‘we are all Americans now’ – that is, we need to change 
ourselves in order to change the Americans. Here, the metaleptic nature of 
the devil’s signs is reintroduced in a form that undermines any clear distinction 
between self and other. It is by changing ourselves that we will change others. 
To affect this change, we need to ‘turn our soul towards God’. This is the only 
way to defeat the temptation that is always there. 
  The devil is not simply there, he is also necessary. As Giorgos declared a 
number of times, ‘God takes aim at us with the devil, […] it is the devil that 
makes us good’. As I was told again and again, ‘God is judging us (krinei) with 
the doings of the devil’. Krino (‘to judge’), of course, is the verb from which the 
noun krisis (‘crisis’) comes. From this point of view, the lives of all Christians 
are thought to be in constant crisis. The economic crisis itself is nothing more 
than an example of this crisis. Thus, to contextualize ‘The Crisis’ in the 
particulars of one’s life or Greek history would be a mistake – for my 
informants, God’s krisis is the context; it is their life.  
  This life did not translate into a unified stance. There was very little that 
brought people like Maria, Giorgos and Christos together in terms of politics or 
resistance. Their appreciation of the devil’s presence was not a call to arms in 
the name of ‘the Greek Nation’ – a nation that has to re-discover itself. 
Although there were one or two exceptions, the emphasis was not on the 
Greeks but on ‘humans’. As Maria put it, ‘we owe money neither to the 
Americans nor the Germans; money we owe to God; we all do, we are all 
humans’. More poignantly, two years after my fieldwork, looking at a 
photograph of the three-year-old Syrian boy who drowned in the 
Mediterranean sea, Maria’s friend Julia said: ‘the devil, just like God, is the 
same for all of us; we are all humans’. 
 18 
 
Conclusion 
In his Meaning in History (1949), Karl Lowith introduces the idea of a 
prophecy in reverse in order to distinguish between two rather different 
understandings of history, 
In the Greek and Roman mythologies and genealogies the past is 
represented as an everlasting foundation. In the Hebrew and Christian view 
of history the past is a promise to the future; consequently, the 
interpretation of the past becomes a prophecy in reverse, demonstrating 
the past as a meaningful ‘preparation’ for the future. (ibid.: 6)  
  In this sense, my informants’ narratives can be described as prophecies in 
reverse. Reconfiguring the order between the past, the present and the future, 
they are used to indicate the past as a moment of truth – a moment of truth 
which allowed them to prepare for the future; a future, however, predating the 
past. This reconfiguration allows them to narrate their encounters with the 
devil in a way that undermines the temporal logic of before and after 
generating their biography retrospectively. In this sense, they establish 
themselves both as effect and cause of their own history. More than that, the 
metaleptic characteristics of their stories are replicated in the ‘intimate 
exteriority’ of their hearts and the perichoretic nature of their ethics – an ethics 
which subverts the distinction between self and other just like their narratives 
subvert the distinction between before and after. 
  Thus, to echo the way I introduced this paper, the stories we tell and the 
lives we live are not necessarily ‘marked by anticipation of some end, one 
which […] does not exist at the beginning’. In the stories my informants tell, 
the end pre-exists the beginning. Transformed into an everyday ethics of the 
heart, their stories obviate the experiential difference between the past, the 
present and the future substituting cause for effect. Their narratives do not 
represent history nor do they belong to it – instead, they are history. Indeed, 
they are reminiscent of the ‘images’ which Melanesians are said to construct 
for themselves. According to Marilyn Strathern, these ‘images’ are unlike 
historical events because they ‘contain within them both past and future time 
[…], they embody history themselves’ (1990: 25). 
  As I tried to show, this embodiment manifests a very particular world. A 
world within which, as Stewart puts it, the ‘devil occupies the lowest rung in in 
a hierarchy of which God commands the pinnacle, with humanity vacillating in 
between’ (1991: 153). In this sense, the devil is always there. In the way he 
constantly seeks to tempt people to sin, he constitutes a perpetual present. 
Indeed, ‘The Crisis’ itself is nothing more than another example of the devil’s 
constant presence. 
  It is in relation to this perpetual present that the future perfect of my 
informants’ narratives is mobilized in order to mark out their past as a moment 
of truth. However, their encounters with the devil and the way they are 
narrated do not simply reflect the constant battle between good and evil. They 
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also convey the way their recognition of the devil’s constant presence and 
their appreciation of the ‘invisible war’ allow them to look forward as though 
looking back. Here metalepsis is much more than a narrative trope or a 
metaphor. It is, first and foremost, a way of life which takes an eschatological 
stance towards the future by turning the past into a meaningful preparation for 
it – a future which, albeit prefigured in the past, needs to be recognized and 
developed through ‘turning one’s soul towards God’ by resisting the devil and 
‘uncovering his customs’. Through this turning, people like Giorgos and 
Christos live and tell their stories hoping to present the right ‘accounts’ to God 
when the time comes – a time which, rather than anticipated, always will have 
been. 
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NOTES 
I am grateful to my friends and interlocutors in Greece for sharing their stories 
with me. I would also like to thank Toby Kelly, Magnus Course, Jonathan 
Spencer, Michelle Lloyd and, especially, Diego Malara for all their 
suggestions. Lastly, without the support of The Munro Committee (University 
of Edinburgh) and the Carnegie Trust this project would not have been 
possible. 
1 All names are pseudonyms. In one or two cases, I have also changed a few 
biographical details (e.g., occupation). 
2  Most of the ethnographic information was collected in Spring/Summer 2014. 
However, I have visited a number of times since then.  
3 David Carr’s (1986) argument that human experience itself has a beginning, 
a middle and an end is the clearest expression of this idea. Of course, from 
David Carr to Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Paul Ricoeur (1984), it has been 
framed in a number of ways – ways Mattingly echoes and develops in her 
work.  
4 Sentences like ‘what I will have been today’ (afto pou tha eho ginei simera) 
or ‘where I will have ended up today’ (pou tha eho katalixei simera) are 
slightly awkward – tha (‘will’) and simera (‘today’) are not usually used 
together. For instance, in terms of Greek grammar, ‘where I will have ended 
up’ would have been more appropriate. However, the imperfect grammar 
further emphasizes the way the past and the future are brought together.     
5 There is something reminiscent of what has been called ‘figural’ 
interpretation of history in Christos’s narrative. ‘Figural’ interpretation has 
been beautifully explored by Erich Auerbach in his essay ‘Figura’ (1984). He 
shows how history was figural in the Biblical exegesis provided by Church 
Fathers like Tertullian – a history, that is, wherein events in the past are 
thought to pre-figure events in the future. For example, Joshua is a figura of 
Christ – Joshua is the ‘type’ which finds its fulfillment in Christ. However, this 
idea of fulfillment does not quite capture the stories my informants tell. In their 
stories, their past is an effect and an offshoot of their future.  
6 For a sophisticated and truly perceptive exploration of an ‘other-oriented’ 
ethics see Diego Malara’s discussion of Orthodox Christians in Addis Ababa 
(2017). 
7 A priest’s stole is very important in this context but this is a story that will 
have to be told elsewhere. 
8 Prophecy has gained quite some prominence in the context of the current 
crisis. For an imaginative articulation of its significance see Eleana Yalouri 
(2016). 
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